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The electronic processing of health information provides considerable benefits to
patients and health care providers at the same time that it creates serious risks to the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data. The Internet provides a conduit for
rapid and uncontrolled dispersion and trafficking of illicitly-obtained private health
information, with far-reaching consequences to the unsuspecting victims. In order to
address such threats to electronic private health information, the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services enacted the HIPAA Security Rule, which thus far has
received little attention in the legal literature. This article presents a critique of the
Security Rule from both legal and technical perspectives. We argue that the Rule suffers
from several defects relating to its narrow definition of “covered entities,” to the limited
scope of information it allows data subjects to obtain about their health information, to
the vagueness and incompleteness of the Rule’s standards and implementation
specifications, and to the lack of a private cause of action. The article
explores the difficult problem of crafting static regulations to adequately address rapidly
changing computer and communications technologies and associated security threats to
private health information. In addition, it develops detailed recommendations for
improving safeguards for electronically processed health records.
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I
INTRODUCTION
The electronic processing of health data provides invaluable benefits to patients
and health care providers. These include speed and flexibility of information processing,
retrieval and communication; long-term cost savings due to increased efficiency; and the
availability of powerful computational techniques that can contribute to improved patient
outcomes.1 Unfortunately, some of these same attributes enable the operation of a market
in illicitly-obtained private health information. The Internet provides a nearly ideal
channel for trafficking in such information, since it permits the information to be
transmitted anywhere in the world quickly, cheaply, and with relatively little risk of
detection.2 This article will analyze the threats to electronic health records and the
deficiencies of regulations that have been enacted to address them. It will also develop
recommendations for improving safeguards for these records.
The risks associated with the electronic storage and transmission of personal
information in general and health data in particular are indeed grave. A New Year’s Day
2006 article in the New York Times included the following statement:
Every week seems to bring reports of a new breach of the computer networks that
contain our most intimate personal information. Scores of companies – including
Bank of America, MasterCard, ChoicePoint and Marriott International – have
admitted to security lapses that exposed millions of people’s financial information
to potential abuse by identity thieves.3

1

See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health
Records, __ U. ILL. L. REV. __ , 2 (forthcoming 2007) (discussing the advantages of electronic health
records).
2
See Young B. Choi et al., Challenges Associated with Privacy in Health Care Industry: Implementation
of HIPAA and the Security Rules, 30 J. MED. SYS. 57, 60 (2006) (stating that private information can be
distributed worldwide within seconds).
3
John Schwartz, What Are You Lookin’ At? N.Y. TIMES, January 1, 2006, at Section 4, 1.
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Another article reported that between February and June of 2005 alone,
“businesses, universities, and government agencies lost . . . ten million records” and that
according to a Gallup poll conducted in August of 2005, one out of five Americans
experienced identity theft.4 In May of 2006, a burglary at the home of a Department of
Veterans Affairs employee resulted in the well-publicized theft of discs containing
names, birthdates, and Social Security numbers of as many as 26.5 million military
veterans.5 Even private wireless cell phone use is vulnerable to public disclosure.
Reportedly, dozens of internet-based companies sell information concerning calls made
and received by cell phone users, which they obtain by posing as customers and asking
for copies of bills.6
The confidentiality of personal health information appears to be compromised
with disturbing frequency. A report that focused on discarded hard drives and disk
sanitization practices disclosed that in August 2002, the United States Veterans
Administration Medical Center in Indianapolis sold or donated 139 of its old computers
without removing confidential information contained on their hard drives, including the
names of veterans who had AIDS and mental illnesses.7 An earlier paper published by
the British Medical Association reports numerous instances of private health information
abuse, including the case of a banker who served on a state health commission and
obtained a list of all cancer patients in his state, which he used to call in the individuals’
loans.8 On April 26, 2006 Aetna announced that a laptop computer containing personal
information concerning 38,000 consumers had been stolen,9 and on May 12, 2006, a
newspaper article reported that a computer breach may have led to the theft of personal
information relating to 60,000 patients who visited Ohio University’s health center.10
Other reported incidents include an inadvertent Internet postings of identifying
information and details of the sex lives of 90 psychotherapy patients, an inadvertent
posting of sixty children’s psychological records on the University of Montana’s website,
a hacker’s illegal downloading of thousands of patients’ medical files from a university
medical center, and the stealing of health information belonging to military personnel and
their families from a contractor’s database.11

4

Daniel B. Prieto, Data Mine, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 2005, at 17.
David Stout, Personal Data of 26.5 Million Veterans Stolen, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at __.
6
Sheryl Harris, Are your cell phone records safe? THE PLAIN DEALER, January 14, 2006 at A1 (reporting
that one company charges only $100 for information about a customer’s last 100 calls).
7
Simson L. Garfinkel & Abhi Shelat, Remembrance of Data Passed: A Study of Disk Sanitization
Practices, 1 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY (2003), available at
http://www.computer.org/security/v1n1/garfinkel.htm.
8
Ross J. Anderson, Security in Clinical Information Systems, British Medical Association (January 4,
1996), pp. 4-6, available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/policy11/policy11.html, citing RMs need
to safeguard computerized patient records to protect hospitals, 9 HOSPITAL RISK MANAGEMENT 129-140
(1993).
9
See Statement of Aetna CEO and President Ronald A. Williams on Data Security available at
http://www.aetna.com/news/2006/pr_20060426.htm.
10
Jennifer Gonzalez, 3rd computer breach at OU within 3 weeks, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 12, 2006, at A1.
11
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 54-55 (2004). See also Nicolas P. Terry, To HIPAA, a Son:
Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and Legal Frameworks for Patient Safety Information, __ WIDENER
L. REV. __ (2006) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=770784 (describing other examples of
dysfunctional “privacy and security systems”).
5
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Why would anyone want to obtain the health information of others? The reasons
are numerous. Private health information can be useful to employers who wish to hire
and retain the healthiest employees,12 to lenders and other businesses with a stake in
individuals’ financial futures and thus in their health status,13 to drug companies that wish
to influence doctors’ prescribing decisions,14 to advertisers and marketers who wish to
tailor their material for particular audiences,15 to health insurers making eligibility and
premium rate decisions concerning individual insurance policies, and even to educational
institutions that might wish to recruit and accept students with the greatest potential for
success and longevity. In a world in which electronic health information can be easily
stolen or accessed, it could also become increasingly of interest to blackmailers and other
criminals.16 For example, after a computer was stolen from a general medical practice,
two prominent women received letters from blackmailers who threatened to publicize the
fact that the women had had abortions.17 Even potential romantic partners who are
looking for a low-risk mate might try to obtain personal health information if it were
easily accessible.
Trafficking in personal health information poses a significant risk to the public.
Once the data is dispersed on the Internet, it becomes available to anyone who is willing
to pay for it,18 and it cannot be expunged. Consequently, the harm to an individual from
illicit or accidental disclosure of health information is potentially unlimited. It is quite
possible for the affected individual to remain unaware of the disclosure and its
12

Anderson, supra note 8 at 5 (reporting that as of 1995 “over half of America’s largest 500 companies
admitted using health records to make hiring and other personnel decisions”). It should be noted, however,
that these health records were most likely lawfully obtained since the Americans with Disabilities Act
permits medical testing of applicants and employees, with some limitations, though it forbids
discrimination against qualified employees with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), (d) (2000). Employees
who are sick or vulnerable to illness are often unappealing to employers because they can cause
absenteeism, productivity, scheduling, and morale problems in the workplace and can raise health
insurance costs. Questions concerning the meaning of the terms “qualified” and “disability” and thus, the
ADA’s scope of coverage, have generated considerable litigation. See generally, Sharona Hoffman,
Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213 (2003).
13
Anderson, supra note 8 at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit reference agency to trade
health records).
14
Id. at 5 (stating that a US drug company purchased a health systems company and obtained a prescription
database for 56 million people, which it was planning to search for individuals whose prescriptions
suggested that they suffered from depression and could benefit from Prozac, a drug produced by the
company). See also Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object to Gathering of Drug Data, N. Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006,
at __ (describing computerized records with information concerning physicians and the drugs they
prescribe that are used by drug sales representatives to influence doctors to write more prescriptions for
drugs produced by their companies or fewer prescriptions of a competitor’s drugs); Robert Steinbrook, For
Sale: Physicians’ Prescribing Data, 354 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2745 (2006) (reporting that during the last
two decades, health care information companies have routinely purchased electronic prescription records
from pharmacies and elsewhere, which they then sold to drug manufacturers).
15
Prieto, supra note __, at 18 (asserting that “[a]s advertisers have sought greater return on their dollar,
they are increasingly relying on personal data to target ads” based on particular attributes); Terry, supra
note __, at __ (stating that PHI is “valuable for secondary uses” such as marketing).
16
Anderson, supra note __, at 5; COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 3 (1997)
[hereinafter FOR THE RECORD] stating that hackers may penetrate computerized systems to steal data,
destroy it, or damage the system.).
17
Anderson, supra note 8, at 5.
18
See Id. at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit reference agency to trade health records.).
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consequences,19 and it may be difficult or impossible to establish how an apparent
disclosure actually occurred. Loss or corruption of health data can also require the
duplication of painful medical tests or even cause serious and life-threatening medical
errors.
Americans are aware of these dangers. A 2005 National Consumer Health
Privacy Survey, which queried two-thousand people, revealed that sixty-seven percent of
respondents were “somewhat” or “very concerned” about the confidentiality of their
medical records.20 Furthermore, thirteen percent of respondents claimed that they had
attempted to protect their own privacy by avoiding medical tests or visits to their regular
physicians, asking doctors to distort diagnoses, or paying for tests out-of-pocket so that
no medical documentation would be sent to insurance companies.21
In order to address the threats to data security associated with the electronic
storage and transmission of private health information, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services enacted the Security Rule under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).22 The HIPAA Security Rule, which became
effective on April 20, 2005 for most covered entities,23 delineates administrative,
physical, and technical safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability
of electronic protected health information (PHI). Under the Rule, PHI includes
“individually identifiable health information” that is electronically or otherwise
transmitted or maintained.24 “Covered entities” include health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit health information
electronically.25 The Security Rule is part of the HIPAA Privacy Rule established in the
HIPAA privacy regulations,26 which were promulgated pursuant to HIPAA’s statutory
authority.27
19

See Prieto, supra note __, at 17 (stating that the average victim becomes aware of identity theft only after
fourteen months, but in some cases, discovering the crime takes ten years). The article does not
specifically address the theft of PHI, which could be hidden more easily since the consumer will not see
suspicious charges on her credit card or tell-tale credit reports.
20
Lynne “Sam” Bishop et al., National Consumer Health Privacy Survey 2005: Executive Summary,
California Health Care Foundation 3 (Nov. 2005).
21
Id. at 4.
22
45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302 – 164.318 (2005). See also Security and Electronic Signature Standards, 63 Fed.
Reg. 43242 (1998) (providing background concerning the Security Rule’s purpose).
23
45 C.F.R. § 164.318 (2005). Small health plans were given an extended adjustment period and were
required to comply with the rule by April 20, 2006.
24
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
25
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). A health care clearinghouse is defined as:
a public or private entity, including a billing service, repricing company, community health
management information system or community health information system, and ‘value-added’
networks and switches, that . . .
(1) Processes or facilitates the processing of health information received from another
entity in a nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data content into standard data elements
or a standard transaction.
(2) Receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes or facilitates the
processing of health information into nonstandard format or nonstandard data content for the
receiving entity.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
26
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-164.534 (2005).
27
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1320d-8 (2000).
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Many have criticized a variety of aspects of the HIPAA Privacy Rule28 but few
have focused specifically on the regulations’ Security Rule. It is our view that the HIPAA
Security Rule has serious deficiencies that hinder its efficacy as a mechanism to impede
the operation of a market in illicitly obtained PHI. These deficiencies are of four
principal types. First, the HIPAA statute and thus the Security Rule do not address
trafficking in private health information by businesses and individuals outside of the
health industry, such as employers, marketers, and lenders that are not “covered
entities.”29 Consequently, these parties are permitted to handle health data without
restriction under HIPAA. Second, while the HIPAA Privacy Rule allows patients to
inspect and copy their PHI,30 it does not enable individuals to establish the provenance of
the data or to verify how the information was used.31 Third, the HIPAA Security Rule
gives covered entities an excessive amount of discretion in deciding what implementation
specifications they will address and how they will do so, and many of its standards and
implementation specifications lack sufficient detail and specificity.32 As a result, careless
or unscrupulous covered entities are very likely to become the main source of illicitly
obtained PHI. Furthermore, well-meaning but resource-poor covered entities that cannot
develop sophisticated expertise with respect to computer security technology are given
insufficient guidance as to how to achieve compliance with the Security Rule. Fourth,
the HIPAA privacy regulations, including the Security Rule, do not establish a private
cause of action for aggrieved individuals.33 Thus, the regulations’ deterrence and
remedial powers are significantly diminished by insufficient enforcement mechanisms.
To address these deficiencies, we propose a detailed set of recommendations. We
acknowledge the challenge of crafting static regulations for an area that is by nature
dynamic because both computer technology and security threats are continually
changing. We also recognize the potential tension between patients’ need for privacy
safeguards and business’ need for efficient and profitable operations. We have
considered the implications of our proposal in a variety of circumstances and have
evaluated them through detailed examples. Our recommendations include: 1) expanding
the definition of “covered entity” to include any person who knowingly stores or
transmits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for any business
purpose related to the substance of such information; 2) broadening the right of access to
28

See SOLOVE, supra note __, at 70 (stating that the HIPAA regulations have apparently pleased nobody”
since health care providers “complain that the regulations are too complicated, cumbersome, and expensive
to follow” and privacy advocates “find the regulations weak and ineffective.”); Pew Internet & American
Life Project, Exposed Online: Why the new federal health privacy regulation doesn’t offer much protection
to Internet users iii (November 2001) available at http://www.healthprivacy.org. (discussing the fact that
many health-related websites are not covered entities).
29
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (3) (2005) (defining a “covered entity” as a “health plan,” “health care
clearinghouse,” or “health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in
connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter.”)
30
45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2005) (establishing that an “individual has a right of access to inspect and
obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated record set”).
31
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2005).
32
See 45 C.F.R. § 164.30(b) (entitled “Flexibility of approach,” the provision establishes that “[c]overed
entities may use any security measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately
implement the standards and implementation specifications” of the Security Rule).
33
Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 33
RUTGERS L.J. 617, 618 (2002).
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PHI so that individuals can obtain information concerning its provenance and uses; 3)
revising several of the Rule’s provisions to provide further detail and guidance and
establishing mechanisms that will facilitate HIPAA Security Rule compliance; and 4)
adding a private cause of action to the law’s enforcement scheme. While we focus our
critique on the Security Rule, some of our recommendations, such as changes in statutory
definitions and scope, necessarily would extend to the Privacy Rule as a whole.
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows. Part II describes the
relevant Security Rule provisions. Part III critiques the Rule and exposes its weaknesses.
Part IV constitutes the recommendations section in which we detail methods for
enhancing PHI security.
II
THE HIPAA SECURITY RULE
The HIPAA Security Rule establishes general security requirements and provides
implementers with broad discretion in choosing appropriate technologies to implement
the standards.34 One of the Rule’s guiding principles is “technological neutrality,” an
approach based on the belief that regulators should not dictate the use of specific
technologies, which may be inappropriate in particular settings or may be superseded by
improved technologies.35 It is clear from the public comments received by the
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to the initial, proposed version of the
Security Rule that industry strongly favored such discretion.36
A.

HIPAA Security Requirements

The Security Rule establishes four general requirements. Covered entities must:
1) ensure the “confidentiality, integrity, and availability” of electronic health information
that they produce, obtain, maintain, or transmit; 2) protect the data against reasonably
anticipated threats to its security or integrity; 3) safeguard against impermissible use or
disclosure of the information; and 4) ensure that their employees comply with the Rule.37
Covered entities may choose the means by which to “reasonably and appropriately”
implement the Rule’s standards, so long as they consider their size, complexity,

34

45 C.F.R.§§ 164.302 – 164.318. See also Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards; Final Rule, 68
Fed. Reg. 8336 (2003) (stating that the final rule was written “to frame the standards in terms that are as
generic as possible and which, generally speaking, may be met through various approaches or
technologies”).
35
See Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 8335 (2003) (describing the
drafters’ “basic assumptions that the entities affected by this regulation are so varied in terms of installed
technology, size, resources, and relative risk, that it would be impossible to dictate a specific solution or set
of solutions that would be useable by all covered entities.”).
36
Id. (stating that “[m]any commenters also supported the concept of technological neutrality, which would
afford them the flexibility to select appropriate technology solutions and to adopt new technology over
time.”). See also id. at 8336 (explaining that numerous commentators asserted that “the security standards
should not be overly prescriptive because the speed with which technology is evolving could make specific
requirements obsolete and might in fact deter technological progress.”).
37
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2005). Permissible and impermissible uses of private health information are
described in Subpart E of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500 – 164.534 (2005).
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capabilities, and technical infrastructure in making their decisions along with the costs of
implementation and the risks of security breaches.38
The HIPAA Security Rule features “standards” and “implementation
specifications” that provide instructions concerning how to fulfill the obligations outlined
in the standards. There are two types of implementation specifications: required and
addressable.39 Required implementation specifications are mandatory.40 By contrast,
implementers may respond to an addressable implementation specification in one of three
ways: 1) by implementing it; 2) by implementing an “equivalent alternative measure”; or
3) by doing neither because implementation would not be “reasonable and appropriate.”41
A covered entity that does not implement an implementation specification must
document its justification for not doing so,42 and all covered entities must review their
compliance and modify their security measures, as needed.43
1.

Administrative Safeguards

Several required implementation specifications are intended to provide
administrative safeguards.44 These are: risk analysis and risk management practices, the
establishment of sanctions for non-compliant employees, and information system activity
reviews.45 Covered entities also must identify a “security official” who is responsible for
compliance with the Security Rule and establish procedures whereby only authorized
individuals have access to electronic protected health information.46 In order to achieve
workforce security, a covered entity should implement authorization and supervision
standards, workforce clearance procedures, and termination of authorization procedures,
but these are considered “addressable” implementation specifications.47
In addition, covered entities should implement a security awareness and training
program for its workforce and implement measures such as security reminders,
mechanisms that protect against malicious software, log-in monitoring, and password
management.48 The Security Rule mandates provision of response and reporting
mechanisms for security incidents49 and contingency plans that focus on data backup,
disaster recovery, emergency mode operation, testing and revision procedures, and
analysis of the criticality of the affected data and applications.50 It also instructs that
covered entities should perform periodic evaluations of their compliance51 and may enter
38

45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2005).
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d) (2005).
40
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(2) (2005).
41
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3) (2005).
42
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1) (2005).
43
45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e) (2005).
44
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (2005).
45
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii) (2005).
46
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2)-(3)(i) (2005).
47
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(3)(ii) (2005).
48
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5) (2005). These are addressable implementation specifications.
49
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(6) (2005).
50
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(7) (2005). The development of testing and revision procedures and applications
and data criticality analysis are addressable implementation specifications. The other safeguards are
required.
51
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(8) (2005).
39
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into written contracts or other arrangements with business associates to handle electronic
protected health information, so long as the associates provide satisfactory assurances
that they will appropriately safeguard the data.52 The Security Rule, however, does not
apply with respect to the transmission of electronic protected health information to
another health care provider who is treating the patient, to a group health plan sponsor, or
to agencies determining eligibility for government programs providing public benefits.53
2.

Physical Safeguards

The HIPAA Security Rule next establishes physical safeguards aimed at thwarting
unauthorized access to electronic information systems and the facilities in which they are
housed while ensuring access to authorized personnel.54 This sub-section describes
several “addressable” implementation specifications, which include designing
contingency operations, facility security plans, and access control and validation
procedures and maintaining records concerning repairs and modifications to securityrelated components of the physical plant.55 In addition to maintaining workstation
security,56 a covered entity must establish procedures that govern the movement of
hardware that contains electronic protected health information within and out of the
facility in question.57 These procedures should address electronic media disposal,
removal of protected health information in cases in which equipment will be re-used for
other purposes, maintenance of records of the hardware’s whereabouts and who is
responsible for it, and data backup and storage prior to moving equipment.58
3.

Technical Safeguards

The required and addressable59 technical safeguards detailed by the HIPAA
Security Rule are designed to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to
electronic protected health information.60 These safeguards include assigning unique
user identification names or numbers, establishing emergency access procedures, having
an automatic logoff after a specific period of inactivity, and implementing encryption and
decryption mechanisms.61 This provision also discusses audit controls, authentication
mechanisms for electronic protected health information and for users who want access to

52

45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(1), (3), and (4) (2005). See also 45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (2005) for specifications
regarding business associate contracts and other arrangements.
53
45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(2) (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(ii)(C) (2005).
54
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(1) (2005).
55
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(2) (2005).
56
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(b) and (c) (2005).
57
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(1) (2005).
58
45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2) (2005). The implementation specifications for disposal and media re-use are
required, while the record-keeping and data backup and storage requirements are addressable.
59
See footnotes for indications of which safeguards are required and which are addressable.
60
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(1) (2005).
61
45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2) (2005). Unique user identification and emergency access procedures are
required, while automatic logoff and encryption and decryption are addressable implementation
specifications.
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it, and measures to ensure security when electronic protected health information is
transmitted electronically.62
B.

Enforcement

The HIPAA legislation authorizes both civil penalties and criminal penalties.63 Since
DHHS is not authorized to conduct criminal prosecutions, only the civil penalties are
addressed in the privacy regulations.64 Under a Final Rule issued on February 16, 2006,
the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s enforcement provisions are applicable to the Security Rule.65
Thus, if a covered entity discloses health information in an unauthorized manner for any
reason, it can be penalized. In addition, it can be penalized for the absence of
appropriate security measures even if no PHI is disclosed as a result of the security
shortcomings.
The provisions establish a primarily complaint-driven enforcement scheme for
privacy violations.66 Persons67 who believe that a covered entity is violating the Privacy
Rule may submit a complaint to the Secretary of HHS,68 who might choose to investigate
it.69 The authority to administer and enforce the Security Rule has been delegated to the
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and thus, CMS will investigate
alleged violations relating to the Security Rule specifically.70 If a covered entity is found
to be noncompliant, it will be informed by the Secretary,71 who will, if possible, attempt
to resolve the matter informally.72 The Secretary has authority to impose civil penalties
for noncompliance in an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars per violation or

62

45 C.F.R. § 164.312(b)-(e) (2005). Mechanisms for information authentication and integrity controls for
the transmission of data are designated “addressable.”
63
42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 and 1320d-6 (2003). The criminal penalty provision is discussed infra note 74.
64
45 C.F.R. §§ 160.500-160.552 (2000).
65
HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390 (February 16, 2006)
(stating that “the final rule amends the existing rules relating to investigation of noncompliance” and the
imposition of penalties “to make them apply to all of the HIPAA Administrative Simplification rules, rather
than exclusively to the privacy standards.” See also 45 C.F.R. § 160.300 (2006) (making the enforcement
provisions applicable to all HIPAA rules, including the Security Rule). Originally, the enforcement
provisions applied only to Subpart E of the Privacy Rule, which limits the circumstances under which
covered entities can use and disclose protected health information.
66
70 Fed. Reg. 20226 (2005). The regulations, however, also provide that HHS may conduct compliance
reviews without receiving a complaint. Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 160.308 (2005).
67
A “Person” is defined as a “natural person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, professional
association or corporation, or other entity, public or private.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
68
45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2005).
69
45 C.F.R. § 160.306(c) (2005).
70
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegation of
Authority, 68 Fed. Reg. 60694 (October 23, 2003). On March 25, 2005, CMS issued a notice entitled
“Procedures for Non-Privacy Administrative Simplification Complaints Under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,” which became effective on April 25, 2005. 70 Fed. Reg.
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$25,000 during a calendar year “for all violations of an identical requirement.”73 In
addition, violators may be subject to criminal prosecution and fined up to $250,000 and
imprisoned for up to ten years.74 A respondent may request a hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ).75 As is typical in administrative proceedings, only
limited discovery is permitted,76 and the ALJ is generally not bound by the Federal Rules
of Evidence.77
III
A CRITIQUE OF THE SECURITY RULE
The HIPAA Security Rule is characterized by several flaws and deficiencies that
greatly detract from its efficacy. We will analyze each of them in this section.
A.

Covered Entities

The HIPAA Security Rule, following its enabling legislation, the HIPAA statute,
covers only health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who
transmit health information electronically.78 Consequently, doctors, hospitals,
pharmacists, health insurers, and HMOs must comply with the HIPAA privacy standards,
but not all parties possessing PHI are covered.79 Thus, websites selling nonprescription
medications or dispensing medical advice,80 employers handling applicants’ and
73
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Department of Justice. 42 U.S.C. 1320d-5(b)(1) (2003); 70 Fed. Reg. 20237.
74
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(b) Penalties
A person described in subsection (a) of this section shall –
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employees’ medical records, marketers, or any other business entities that obtain PHI are
not bound by the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule.81 The Rule’s narrow scope
of coverage compromises its ability to protect Americans against misuse of their PHI. It
leaves the vast amount of health information that is stored on systems maintained by noncovered entities especially vulnerable to theft, destruction, or alteration.82
It is arguable, in fact, that the greatest PHI–related threats are associated with the
acquisition of PHI by non-health care related entities. Many commentators have
expressed concern that disclosure of health information can lead to loss of various types
of insurance, employment and educational discrimination, denial of loans, and being
severely disadvantaged in custody battles, adoption efforts, parole proceedings and
personal injury lawsuits.83 Blackmail, identity theft, and other crimes perpetrated by
those with access to illicitly obtained PHI are also grave dangers.84
The European Union has tackled the contemporary threat to privacy very
aggressively. The European Union Privacy Directive85 provides wide-ranging privacy
protection. It binds “Member States”86 and extends to the processing of all personal data
by any party, with few exceptions.87 Specifically, the Directive’s broad language
establishes that “Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.” It then delineates
exceptions to the rule, which in the case of health information, relate to the provision of
medical care.88
By contrast, the U.S. has a much more segmented approach to privacy, though it has
enacted numerous laws that address privacy issues. The Privacy Act of 1974,89 for
example, governs all federal agencies. The law forbids the disclosure of personal
information (with some exceptions),90 aims to safeguard the security of records,91 and
establishes a right for individuals to review their records and request corrections of
errors.92 While the law covers only federal agencies, it is in some ways much broader
than the HIPAA Privacy Rule because it defines “record” to mean not only medical data,
81
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but identifiable information about people’s “education, financial transactions, medical
history, and criminal or employment history.”93
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s Title V is devoted to privacy.94 It requires financial
institutions to respect customers’ privacy and shield the security and confidentiality of
customers’ private information.95 To this end, the law prohibits financial institutions
from disclosing “nonpublic personal information” to a nonaffiliated third party if the
disclosure is not authorized by the law96 and requires regulatory agencies to establish
standards concerning appropriate “administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” for
private information.97
A number of other laws also protect privacy in particular realms. The Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 governs the accessibility and disclosure of
certain student records.98 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 mandates that
cable operators inform subscribers of any personal information that is collected, the
disclosure of such information, and the subscribers’ right of access to the information.99
Information cannot be collected or disclosed without the customer’s written or electronic
consent unless it is needed for a “legitimate business activity.”100 The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act101 governs electronic surveillance and restricts searches and
interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications.102 The Video Privacy
Protection Act of 1988103 provides that video store operators may not disclose the titles of
the videos rented or purchased by any particular customer, though some exceptions
apply.104 The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994105 requires states to obtain a
driver’s consent before divulging personal information contained in motor vehicle
records to marketers unless one of the stated exceptions is applicable.106 The Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998107 establishes that operators of websites targeted at
children must acquire parental consent in order to use the personal data of children under
thirteen.108
The laws discussed above provide varying degrees of privacy protection to
individuals with respect to particular kinds of information or particular holders of private
information.109 It is unlikely that the U.S. will be willing to adopt a privacy law that is as
93
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far-reaching as the European Union Privacy Directive. However, in the spirit of already
existing U.S. legislation, we should at the very least have a law that narrowly targets only
health information but is broad enough to include within its scope all parties that maintain
or transmit such information in electronic form for business reasons related to the
substance of the PHI.
This approach has already been suggested in a bipartisan bill introduced by Senators
Hillary Clinton and Bill Frist, entitled the Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of
2005.110 The bill was designed “[t]o reduce healthcare costs, improve efficiency, and
improve healthcare quality through the development of a nationwide interoperable health
information technology system.”111 The bill provided that the HIPAA privacy
regulations be amended to “apply to any health information stored or transmitted in an
electronic format.”112 In our recommendation section, Part IV, we will similarly
recommend that the term “covered entities” in the HIPAA Privacy Rule be expanded to
include any person who stores or transmits individually identifiable electronic PHI for
any business purpose related to the substance of the PHI.
B.

PHI Accessibility

The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows patients access to their PHI.113 Specifically, the
regulations provide that “an individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy
of protected health information about the individual in a designated record set,”114 with
some exceptions, such as psychotherapy notes and information compiled for purposes of
litigation or administrative proceedings.115 Furthermore, the Privacy Rule enables
individuals to request amendment of PHI that is incorrect.116
If the definition of “covered entity” is expanded to include any person who
knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable electronic PHI for any business
purpose related to the substance of the PHI,117 the right of access to inspect and obtain a
copy of PHI should extend to all electronic PHI that is processed by any covered entity.
In addition, the right to correct PHI should be similarly extended. Thus, if an employer118
or a bank obtains PHI in order to make employment or loan decisions, the individual who
is the subject of that information should have a right of access to that data and a right to
amend it if it is incorrect.
Furthermore, the right of access should be expanded to include a right to establish the
provenance of the data and the purpose for which it is used. This approach has been
utilized by the Fair Credit Reporting Act,119 which requires all consumer reporting
110
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agencies to disclose to consumers, upon request, not only the information in the
consumer’s file,120 but also “the sources of the information.”121 In the case of health care
providers, health plans, and many health care clearinghouses, the origins and purposes of
the data will be obvious from the documents themselves, and thus, this requirement will
add no burden to the covered entity. However, in the case of other parties, establishing
the provenance and uses of the information could be essential to determining whether the
Security Rule has been breached by any covered entity, allowing the inappropriate
dissemination of PHI. Information concerning the data’s origins will also be necessary in
order to ascertain whether criminal prosecution should be pursued, how widely the
information has been distributed, and how much harm might be done to the individual at
issue.
As discussed above, PHI is already commonly targeted by hackers.122 It is not
unrealistic to expect that a black market will develop for PHI to which businesses,
marketers, blackmailers, and others could turn in order to purchase health information.
According to one source, about ten billion dollars in U.S. medical transcription business
is outsourced to foreign countries.123 Foreign data processors of PHI are “business
associates”124 of covered entities, and are bound by certain privacy protection
requirements under the HIPAA regulations.125 However, DHHS has admitted that it is
unable to effectively regulate offshore business associates or monitor their contracts with
U.S. companies.126 It is entirely possible that businesses or individuals processing PHI in
distant locations, far from the direct reach of U.S. regulatory powers, will begin selling
PHI to third parties who believe it offers opportunities for profit.
Several databases already sell lists of persons suffering from a large number of
ailments.127 These sources include the Medical Marketing Service128 and Hippo Direct
Medical Maladies Direct Marketing Lists.129 In addition, health care information
companies sell individual physicians’ prescribing records to pharmaceutical companies
that use them to market particular drugs to specific doctors.130 These lists are not
necessarily compiled by illegal means. Rather, medical and other personal data can often
be mined from purchase information, supermarket savings cards, surveys, sweepstakes
and contest entries, U.S. Census records, credit card transactions, phone records, credit
records, product warranty cards, or public records that are rightfully in the possession of
120
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those aggregating the information.131 In addition, some sources sell information to
interested buyers and are not currently prohibited from doing so by law. Thus, health
care information companies purchase prescription data directly from pharmacies and, in
turn, sell it to drug companies.132 Consequently, individuals are vulnerable to
manipulation, exploitation, and discrimination by those who have access to their PHI.
The patients, in turn, should, at the very least, be empowered to learn the origins and uses
of PHI that falls into the hands of various parties.
This disclosure approach is consistent with the one adopted by the European Union
Privacy Directive. The Directive provides that each data subject may obtain
“confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are being processed and
information at least as to the purposes of the processing,” as well as the recipients,
contents, and source of the data.133 The approach is also consistent with the Fair
Information Practices (FIP) outlined in a report issued in 1973 by the U.S. Department of
Housing, Education, and Welfare.134 The FIP provide, in relevant part:
•
•

•

There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is
in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes
without his consent.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended
use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.135

Under these principles, data subjects have a right to know how their PHI is used.
They should also have a right to know the source of the information possessed by any
party so that they can ensure that their information is not being misused or utilized for
purposes for which it was not intended. In Part IV.B we will discuss mechanisms for
allowing meaningful inquiry concerning the origins and uses of electronically-stored PHI.
C.

Insufficient Compliance Guidelines

The Security Rule leaves the mechanisms of implementing the outlined security
standards to the discretion of the covered entity.136 While flexibility is often a desirable
131
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quality, it can also be hazardous in the regulatory context, because it can leave those
subject to regulation without sufficient guidance as to how to comply with legal
requirements.137 In this case, it is unrealistic to expect that every health care provider
will have the technical expertise and ability to determine on its own how to implement
the security standards. Furthermore, some organizations could use the regulations’
vagueness as a justification for establishing minimal PHI security measures. According
to several sources, information technology appears to be a low priority for the health care
industry. As of 2002, only two to three percent of funding was devoted to the electronic
management of PHI, compared to ten to fifteen percent of funding devoted by other
industries to advance information technology.138 Furthermore, the health care industry is
“generally considered to be 10 to 15 years behind other industries with regard to
security.”139
A careful reading of just a few of the Security Rule’s provisions will illustrate its
characteristic weaknesses. In a provision entitled “Flexibility of Approach,” the Rule
states: “Covered entities may use any security measures that allow the covered entity to
reasonably and appropriately implement the standards and implementation
specifications.”140 The regulations elaborate on the “reasonably and appropriately”
standard only by instructing covered entities to take into account the entity’s size,
complexity, capabilities, and technical infrastructure; the security measures’ costs; and
the “probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic protected health
information.”141
The above language does not explain the term “criticality” and fails to provide
guidance concerning how to identify “potential risks.” Likewise, in its “Administrative
Safeguards” section, the Security Rule requires covered entities to “[c]onduct an accurate
and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information.”142 No further details
are provided concerning how the complex task of risk analysis is to be accomplished.
In response to comments received during the proposed Rule’s public comment period,
HHS explained that
A thorough and accurate risk analysis would consider “all relevant losses” that would
be expected if the security measures were not in place. “Relevant losses” would
include losses caused by unauthorized uses and disclosures and loss of data integrity
that would be expected to occur absent the security measures.143
136
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However, this description also lacks sufficient specificity. For example, whose losses
are to be considered – those suffered by the data subjects, by covered entities,144 by
business associates, or by other stakeholders? How direct or remote should the potential
risks be in order to be considered? Unauthorized disclosure of PHI to various parities can
affect insurance coverage, job prospects, family dynamics, and even social
opportunities.145 Should all of these potential consequences be contemplated?
If covered entities are to maintain discretion under the Security Rule’s flexible
approach,146 the key to ensuring that they choose effective security measures is a
requirement that they implement rigorous risk analysis and management processes.
These processes should identify, analyze, and mitigate the particular risks associated with
health information disclosure for various stakeholders, and especially for data subjects.
The Security Rule fails to provide sufficient guidance for the development of such
measures.
Besides exhibiting a low level of specificity in its security standards, the Security
Rule fails to address certain important issues. The Security Rule omits an explicit
requirement that covered entities, perhaps with the assistance of consultants or
vendors,147 identify the relevant best current security practices of the health informatics
and computer security communities. Such a requirement is needed to ensure that covered
entities are knowledgeable about sound security practices and emergent security risks and
their countermeasures. The rapid exploitation of newly discovered vulnerabilities in
software systems and applications by attackers makes it essential that covered entities be
extremely diligent in learning about and responding to them. Covered entities or their
agents should utilize the substantial amount of relevant information that is provided by
reputable organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO),
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST), the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP), and
software vendors.148
Another crucial omission from the Security Rule is guidance concerning the risks
inherent in the development, operation, and maintenance of the computer software that
provides the functionality of systems that process electronic PHI. Such software is often
extremely complex, comprising many thousands or millions of program instructions,
most of which are executed only under particular conditions. Errors in software
development are virtually inevitable. Any software defect, such as a missing or
erroneous sequence of instructions, becomes a security vulnerability if an attacker can
exploit it to his or her benefit and to the detriment of system stakeholders. Moreover,
mistakes in the configuration and operation of software can easily render it insecure,149 as
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can errors made during software maintenance,150 the process of modifying software to
correct defects or to enhance its functionality. Thus, covered entities should be required
to consider the risks associated with software as part of their risk analysis process and to
follow best current practices for software development, validation, operation, and
maintenance. These risks include, among others: incorrect functionality resulting in
erroneous output, missing functionality, poor “usability,” poor documentation, “crashes”
and other critical failures, and excessive costs and delays in development leading to
reduced emphasis on product quality and security.151 All of these risks can adversely
affect the security of electronic private health information.
If compliance with the Security Rule’s standards is not to be a sham, the Rule’s
standards and implementation specifications must be augmented, and covered entities
must receive further guidance as to how to achieve their obligations. Part IV.C will
develop recommendations for elucidating the Security Rule’s requirements and
facilitating compliance through instruments that limit its cost and burdensomeness.
D.

Private Cause of Action

The HIPAA Security Rule does not provide for a private cause of action.152 Rather,
enforcement is achieved through administrative procedures and hearings before an
ALJ.153 It is noteworthy that under the Clinton administration, the DHHS Secretary’s
recommendations to Congress included a proposal for a private right of action, but this
approach was ultimately rejected.154
Under the enforcement system established by the regulations, any aggrieved
individual has a right to file a complaint with the DHHS Secretary.155 At his discretion,
the Secretary may investigate the complaint.156 If a violation is found, the Secretary is to
impose a penalty on the offender157 and collect the money,158 and no damages are
available for persons who are aggrieved or injured by the privacy lapse. At the request of
the covered entity, a hearing may be held before an ALJ, but the only parties to
participate in the hearing process are the respondent and DHHS personnel.159
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By contrast to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, many of the other American privacy laws
establish a private cause of action. These include the Privacy Act of 1974,160 the Cable
Communications Policy Act,161 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,162 the Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988,163 and the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994.164
The laws provide explicitly for a right to recover attorneys’ fees and costs so that even
plaintiffs with minimal damages resulting from inappropriate disclosure are likely to find
attorneys who are willing to litigate their cases. Like the above-listed laws, the European
Union Privacy Directive supports the notion of private litigation and mandates that
“Member States shall provide for the right of every person to a judicial remedy for any
breach of the rights” embodied by the state’s applicable privacy law.165
We recommend that the HIPAA Security Rule’s enforcement provisions, which apply
to the entirety of the HIPAA privacy regulations,166 be revised to include a private cause
of action. Further details concerning suggested procedures and remedies will be
discussed in Part IV.D below. At this point, however, since covered entities would surely
protest against the prospect of costly and onerous private litigation, it is appropriate to
justify our recommendation and analyze the contributions a private cause of action could
make to the enforcement of electronic PHI security.
If the HIPAA privacy regulations are intended to protect data subjects, they must
provide access to a remedy when individuals’ rights are violated and must not leave
victims out of the enforcement process. The HIPAA regulations provide little
satisfaction for aggrieved persons and discount their potential injuries by failing to
include them in enforcement proceedings and by providing them with no personal
remedy.
Moreover, private litigation is often needed as an adjunct to administrative procedures
for deterrence purposes. Aggressive pursuit of governmental enforcement actions may be
dependent upon political priorities and pressures, such as the degree to which a case is
perceived as advancing the general public interest167 or budgetary and other resource
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allocation constraints.168 Thus, clear violations that affect only a single person could be
ignored, and cases that would not set important precedents might not be litigated by the
government no matter how justified prosecution would be. Such inevitable resource
rationing decisions can leave a significant deterrence void, which can only be filled
through private enforcement.
Private litigation features several important advantages. It can not only effectively
restrict unlawful conduct through the threat of costly and well-publicized court
proceedings, but also can often resolve cases more quickly than administrative
enforcement handled by overburdened agencies.169 Furthermore, careful judicial review
that produces published opinions can serve an important rulemaking function by setting
precedents that interpret vague language in administrative regulations.170 While HIPAA
mandates that ALJs must issue decisions containing findings of fact and conclusions of
law,171 the decisions are to be issued only to the parties and are unlikely to be published
in any widely accessible format.172 Cases that capture media attention, as some lawsuits
do, have the added advantage of educating members of the public at large concerning
their rights and obligations under the law.173
DHHS has, in fact already been criticized for grossly deficient enforcement of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule.174 Between April 14, 2003 and June of 2006, DHHS received
19,420 complaints concerning violations of privacy.175 However, no civil fine has been
imposed,176 and only two criminal actions have been brought under HIPAA’s criminal
enforcement provision.177 One case prosecuted a hospital phlebotomist who accessed the
medical records of a terminal cancer patient in Seattle and obtained credit cards in his
name,178 and the other resulted in the conviction of a Texas woman who sold the medical
records of an FBI agent.179
One might argue that several causes of action relating to privacy violations already
exist in tort law, rendering a statutory private cause of action under HIPAA unnecessary.
The tort of public disclosure of private facts consists of four elements: (a) public
168
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disclosure; (b) of a private fact; (c) that would be objectionable and offensive to a
reasonable person; and (d) that is not of legitimate public concern.180 Most courts,
however, have found that in order to support this theory of liability, plaintiffs must
prove widespread dissemination of personal information to the public181 and have
deemed this tort theory to fit mostly cases involving publication through the media.182
In the context of HIPAA violations, however, PHI will generally be delivered to
particular interested parties, such as drug representatives, employers, or individuals with
criminal intent, rather than to the general public, and thus, the tort of public disclosure
of private facts will be inapplicable.
A more fruitful tort theory for plaintiffs might be breach of confidentiality.183 Courts
have based the patient’s right of confidentiality upon a variety of sources, including
privilege statutes protecting physician-patient communications, licensing statutes
prohibiting the disclosure of patient information without authorization, and medical
ethics principles articulated in the Hippocratic Oath and other sources.184 In Horne v.
Patton,185 for example, the court found that a physician breached his duty of
confidentiality by disclosing medical information to the patient’s employer. The court
ruled that a doctor has a duty not to disclose patient information obtained in the course of
treatment and that a private cause of action exists in cases where the duty is breached.186
An action for breach of confidentiality can be maintained regardless of the degree to
which the information has been publicly distributed or of its offensiveness, and there is
no requirement to prove the intent of the perpetrator.187
Nevertheless, in general, the tort of breach of confidentiality can be established only
when the perpetrator and the victim of the breach of confidentiality had a direct
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relationship.188 Plaintiffs have also occasionally prevailed against third parties who
knowingly induced physicians to reveal confidential information in violation of
physician-patient confidentiality responsibilities, but here too the improper disclosure is
made by the doctor.189
The breach of confidentiality tort, therefore, will not extend to cases in which insurers
or clearinghouses, rather than physicians or hospitals, legitimately possess PHI and
disclose it to third parties who are not entitled to the data. Similarly, if the definition of
“covered entities” is extended to encompass a large variety of parties in possession of
PHI, the breach of confidentiality tort will not apply to disclosures made by employers,
data miners, and others who obtained PHI by means other than physician inducement.
Consequently, a statutory cause of action is needed to capture the many privacy threats
that do not fit within the narrow bounds of common law causes of action. In addition,
because breach of confidentiality is a common law tort, the standard for establishing
liability can vary from state to state.190 A federal statutory cause of action with explicit
guidelines regarding damages will diminish inequities and inconsistencies in case
outcomes.
IV
RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section we provide four primary recommendations to enhance the efficacy of
the Security Rule. These include: 1) expanding the scope of the HIPAA Privacy Rule
through revision of the definitions of “covered entity” and “health information”; 2)
enabling individuals to receive information concerning the origins and uses of their PHI;
3) bolstering existing standards and implementation specifications and providing covered
entities with guidance and mechanisms that will facilitate compliance with the Security
Rule’s requirements; and 4) establishing a private cause of action for aggrieved
individuals. Our recommendations are designed to create fixed regulations that are
workable in the dynamic and ever-changing realms of computer technology and security
vulnerabilities. They also seek to balance patients’ need for privacy protection against
business’ need to operate efficiently and profitably. We have carefully crafted our
definitions to avoid creating unrealistic burdens for those who cannot bear them. We
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have also considered the implications of our proposals in a variety of circumstances,
which we will illustrate through detailed examples.
A.

Expanding the Regulatory Scope
1.

Covered Entities

Because health care providers, insurers and clearinghouses are by no means the only
entities to maintain and transmit PHI, it is illogical to limit the jurisdiction of the Security
Rule in particular and the privacy regulations in general to these three types of entities.191
The threat to electronic PHI reaches far beyond the health care field, since a variety of
parties, such as marketers, blackmailers, and anyone with a stake in an individual’s
financial future, might be interested in obtaining health information.192
Consequently, the term “covered entity” in the HIPAA Privacy Rule193 should be
expanded to include a fourth component that reads: “any person who knowingly stores or
transmits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for any business
purpose related to the substance of such information.” At the same time, some of the
Privacy Rule’s “Applicability” sections194 and the “Applicability” provision of the
HIPAA legislation itself195 would need to be revised to add the above-described fourth
covered category.
The term “Person” is defined in the privacy regulations as “a natural person, trust or
estate, partnership, corporation, professional association or corporation, or other entity,
public or private.”196 The term “business” should be defined as an “activity or enterprise
undertaken for purposes of livelihood or profit.”197
Admittedly, limiting the scope of regulatory coverage to those who utilize PHI for
business purposes related to the substance of the PHI will result in the persistence of
some significant security threats. For example, volunteers associated with religious
organizations might collect and electronically store large volumes of information about
community members who have been hospitalized or have disabilities for purposes of
providing them with assistance. If this data is not secured through adequate computer
technology and security practices, it could be inadvertently or deliberately disseminated
to unwanted sources, and yet, this volunteer activity could not be defined as “business”
under the proposed revision and would not be addressed by the Privacy Rule.
Nevertheless, it is inadvisable to extend the regulations beyond the suggested revision
because doing so, ironically, could result in increased governmental invasion of privacy
rather than enhanced privacy protection. To illustrate, a definition of “covered entity”
that included any person who handled electronic PHI for any reason whatsoever would
capture private citizens who e-mailed each other about a friend’s medical problem.
These individuals would be required to purchase costly security technology for their
computers and would be subject to penalties for disseminating news of the illness to third
191
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parties without the data subject’s consent. Such a rule would constitute unwarranted
government intervention in purely private matters. In the case of the volunteers discussed
above, application of the privacy regulations to volunteer activities would also be
undesirable because the cost of compliance and the threat of liability might deter
engagement in charitable work and, therefore, hurt rather than promote the interests of
those who are sick or have disabilities. It should also be recalled that several relevant
causes of action exist under tort theories, such as public disclosure of private facts and
breach of confidentiality.198 Thus, disclosure of private health information by parties that
are not covered by the Privacy Rule’s revised definition could, in appropriate
circumstances, be addressed through tort law, if they cause injury to the data subject.
Furthermore, limiting covered entities to those that knowingly process individually
identifiable health information in electronic form for any business purpose related to the
substance of such information addresses the fact that some parties might unintentionally
and inadvertently come to possess health information. For example, a photo shop that
develops pictures from digital cameras could handle pictures revealing scars and physical
impairments, or memorializing hospitalizations, births, and other health-related events.
These might be stored for a time on the business’ computer even though no employee
specifically knows of their existence or uses them for any purpose relating to health and
medicine. It would be excessive and impolitic to burden all photo shops with the
requirements of the Security Rule and other privacy regulations based on the possibility
that some of the pictures they develop will contain medical data.
The final qualification of the definition, which restricts covered entities to those that
process PHI for any business purpose related to the substance of such information aims
to exclude those who might come to handle some form of PHI in the course of their
business but who do not actually use the contents of the information. Thus, the photo
shop described above would be excluded from coverage not only for the reasons already
discussed, but also because it does not utilize the contents of health information
concerning individuals for any business purpose.
To illustrate further, a small “mom and pop” store might sell over-the-counter
medications along with food and other items. If a customer pays by credit card, these
drugs might be scanned for payment purposes and associated with the customer’s credit
card number in electronic transaction records. The store operators, however, would
retain the information only for purposes of credit card records and would not utilize
specific information concerning the customer’s health-related purchases for any business
purpose.199 It would be inappropriate to require the mom and pop store to comply with
the HIPAA privacy regulations’ requirements based solely on its sale of pain relief or
cold medications.
By contrast, pharmacies selling prescription drugs that are labeled with the patient’s
name and doctor’s instructions have far more extensive information about patients,
including the names of their doctors, histories of their prescription drug purchases over
time, and other details, which they utilize for purposes of refills and identifying repeat
customers who fill new prescriptions. Drug stores are thus justifiably covered entities.200
198

See supra notes 180-189 and accompanying text.
If, however, the store operators wished to sell individually identifiable information about the purchase of
health products to third parties and thereby profit from its processing, they would become covered entities.
200
SOLOVE, supra note __, at 208.
199

25

Under the proposed definition, most if not all “business associates” will also become
covered entities by virtue of being hired specifically to process PHI.201 This coverage is
consistent with the existing regulations, which state that a “covered entity may be a
business associate of another covered entity”202 and will provide reinforced protection to
data subjects. Business associates will not only be bound by the terms of their contracts
with other covered entities, which are governed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,203 but will
also themselves be subject to all of the Privacy Rule’s provisions, to HHS investigations
and administrative enforcement actions,204 and to private litigation in case of statutory
violations.
2.

Health Information

The recommended change to the definition of “covered entity” will necessitate an
expansion of the meaning of “health information,” which is found in the privacy
regulations’ definition section205 as well as in HIPAA’s statutory definition section.206
“Health information” currently means:
any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that –
(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health
authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse;
and
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of health care to an individual.
This definition excludes PHI that is provided by individuals without the involvement of a
health professional and is handled by financial institutions, marketers, website operators,
and many other parties with an interest in individuals’ electronic PHI. An expansion of
the concept of “covered entities” will necessitate a parallel expansion in the meaning of
“health information.” An appropriate definition can be derived from the proposed Health
Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005,207 discussed previously.208 The bill defines
“health information” to mean “any information, recorded in any form or medium, that
relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
201
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individual, the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual.”209 This language does not limit
“health information” based on who its creator or recipient was.
While this definition is quite broad, it should be qualified to require a clear
association between data and the physical or mental health status of a particular
individual. Recall the above example of a grocery store selling non-prescription
medication, vitamins, or dietary supplements.210 Do records of purchases of such items
constitute “health information”? On the one hand, data miners may be able to infer the
existence of particular diseases from a series of seemingly unrelated purchases. Buying a
combination of high calorie dietary supplements such as “Ensure,” pain medication, and
particular vitamins could indicate that an individual has AIDS or cancer. On the other
hand, many substances can be utilized for a broad spectrum of conditions, ranging from a
headache to post-surgical care, and many items are bought for use by persons other than
the purchaser. The fact of the sale does not clearly reveal specific information
concerning a particular individual’s health status. Consequently, records of sales of nonprescription health related goods should not be considered to be covered by HIPAA even
if they are maintained in electronic form.211 We therefore recommend that “health
information” be defined as “any information, recorded in any form or medium, that
clearly relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
individual, the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the past, present, or future
payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual.”
Because we cannot anticipate every circumstance that will arise and require
interpretation of the regulatory standards, we cannot provide comprehensive guidance
concerning the meaning of “health information” in every hypothetical instance. Further
elucidation of the Privacy Rule’s requirements will be achieved over time through further
guidance provided by HHS and the courts in response to specific controversies.212
3.

Uses and Disclosures

The new definition of “covered entity” would render all of the privacy
regulations’ provisions applicable to anyone who knowingly transmits or maintains
electronic PHI for any business purpose related to the substance of the PHI. A
particularly significant section of the Privacy Rule is the “uses and disclosures”
provision,213 which prohibits the utilization and dissemination of PHI without the
patient’s consent except in specific circumstances that generally relate to medical
treatment or obligations established by law.214 With an expanded definition of “covered
entity,” this provision would have a dramatically greater impact because it would
constrain many more parties handling PHI. This consequence is a salutary development
that will provide much more meaningful protection for individually-identified health
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information. Employers, life insurers, marketers, retailers and others could not use PHI
or disclose it to third parties without obtaining the consent of the data subjects.
The required contents of covered entities’ notice of privacy practices, including
use and disclosures, are specified in the federal regulations.215 The regulations also
require that each authorization be signed and dated by the data subject.216 The
regulations, however, do not instruct covered entities to alert data subjects to the fact that
a risk of unauthorized disclosure will exist no matter what security measures are
implemented. Because awareness of the risk could be essential to individuals’ decisionmaking and provision of meaningful consent, we recommend that the regulatory notice
provision be amended to require that covered entities include a statement such as “despite
our efforts to safeguard your privacy, a risk remains that your electronically-stored PHI
will be disclosed without authorization because of an unanticipated security failure.”217
Individuals who sign an authorization containing this statement will be empowered to
conduct their own risk analysis and to make a more educated decision about consent.
The expanded prohibition will adversely affect marketing218 and data mining
operations, but it will not eradicate them. Covered entities that wish to sell PHI would
have to obtain consent from those whose data is disclosed,219 but this may willingly be
given if the request is carefully worded. For example, many individuals might provide
authorization if they are told that their information “will be used to identify products that
will better fit your needs.” Data miners that garner information from sources other than
the person to which it relates would likewise need to obtain consent for every sale of their
lists. To simplify matters, a “do not market list,” similar to the “national do not call list”
that relates to phone solicitations could be constructed.
The Privacy Rule details numerous exceptions to the use and disclosure
prohibition, all of which would apply to the newly covered entities.220 These exemptions
include, among others, uses and disclosures without consent that are: 1) required by law;
2) necessary for public health activities, 3) relate to victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic
violence; 3) required for purposes of health oversight activities; 4) necessary for judicial
and administrative proceedings 5) required for law enforcement purposes; 6) necessary to
avert a serious threat to health or safety; and 7) needed for specialized government
functions.221 It is possible that other, unanticipated exceptions will be necessitated by
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the expansion of the “covered entities” definition. These may be identified through
public input provided during the notice and comment period that will follow the proposal
of the amendments delineated in this Article.222
In addition, the HHS website, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa, establishes an
avenue for communicating with the agency concerning comments and questions.
Specifically, it provides:
…you may submit an e-mail by clicking on the mailbox (OCRPrivacy@hhs.gov).
Individual responses will not be provided, however, we will address concerns
of general interest through development of new FAQs or other guidance for
inclusion on our web site. As an alternative, you may call the HIPAA toll-free
number at (866) 627-7748.
Thus, inquiries could be submitted to HHS concerning the permissibility of particular
uses and disclosures, whether certain data constitutes “health information,” and other
matters requiring clarification.
4.

Alternatives to Revising the Privacy Rule

An alternative approach to modifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule would be to
amend a large number of laws that govern the behavior of actors who might pose a threat
to medical privacy. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act places boundaries
upon the timing, content, and use of employer-conducted medical inquiries and
examinations.223 It does not, however, address the permissibility of acquiring medical
data from third parties or the security measures that must be applied to any health records
possessed by employers.224 This provision could be revised to indicate explicitly that it is
impermissible for employers to obtain health information about applicants or employees
without the informed consent of the individuals in question and to address the security of
electronic medical data. By way of a second example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
requires financial institutions to safeguard the confidentiality of their customer’s
nonpublic personal information225 but allows for its disclosure in a variety of
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circumstances.226 This law too could be tightened to establish a more rigid prohibition of
PHI disclosure and to instruct financial institutions to employ appropriate security
safeguards for computerized PHI.
Nevertheless, a piecemeal approach to enhancing PHI protection is undesirable. First,
from a practical standpoint, legislatures are unlikely to revisit numerous statutes in order
to address PHI issues. Second, the process of revising multiple laws to include detailed
security mandates would be extremely cumbersome. Finally, a statute-by-statute
approach is likely to lead to inconsistencies in levels of protection furnished by different
laws and to the introduction of new ambiguities in statutory language that will require
judicial interpretation. By contrast, a revision of the HIPAA Privacy Rule will provide a
comprehensive repair to the law. Broadening the definitions of “covered entity” and
“health information” will significantly augment the efficacy of the HIPAA Security Rule
in particular and the Privacy Rule in general and will address many additional threats to
health information privacy.
B.

Allowing for Meaningful Inquiry Regarding the Origins and Uses of PHI

As explained earlier, the HIPAA privacy regulations allow patients to inspect and
obtain copies of their PHI from covered entities.227 So long as the only entities covered
by HIPAA are health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers, the
origins and uses of the documents should generally be obvious from the documents
themselves and the party from which they were obtained. However, if the privacy
regulations are expanded, as we recommend, to cover any person who knowingly stores
or transmits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for any
business purpose related to the substance of such information, it will become important
for individuals to be able not only to have access to PHI that is possessed by others, but
also to establish the provenance of the data and the manner in which it is used. This
evidence will be vital for purposes of determining both the extent of the injury to the
individual and the existence of Privacy Rule breaches on the part of data sources.
The requirement of informed consent for the use or dissemination of PHI228 should
allow individuals to remain educated concerning the movement of their PHI in most
cases. A party that wishes to transmit PHI to another would need to obtain authorization
from the affected individuals. However, the right of inquiry described above will provide
an added information resource in cases in which data is obtained accidentally, through the
black market or by other unlawful means. It will also serve as a deterrent to malfeasance.
If a covered entity obtains PHI from a dubious source and then seeks authorization to use
it, the data subject is likely to be surprised by the request for consent and to inquire about
the origins of the data. An unsatisfactory response would likely lead the data subject to
refuse to authorize data use and thus, the purchaser will have wasted its effort and money
in obtaining the PHI. Furthermore, the data subject may file a complaint with the
government and/or initiate litigation against the source that distributed the PHI in
226
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violation of the regulations. The expanded right of inquiry should, consequently,
incentivize covered entities to engage in due diligence to determine the legitimacy of PHI
suppliers. Because it provides data subjects with an inexpensive means of conducting
preliminary investigations concerning potentially inappropriate PHI disclosures, this
mechanism should also deter regulatory violations.
The privacy regulations allow covered entities to charge “reasonable, cost-based fees”
f or the costs of copying, postage, and labor associated with providing individuals with
access to their PHI.229 These charges should prevent frivolous inquiries and harassment
of covered entities by the public.
The process of inquiry should not be excessively burdensome for covered entities and
could be easily automated. Those processing PHI should establish websites to which
individuals can submit queries concerning whether the entity possesses their PHI, and, if
so, where it originated and how it has been used. Generally, respondents will be able to
develop boilerplate answers to diminish the need for individually designed narratives.
For example, common responses might be “obtained from Hippo Direct list”230 and “used
for marketing purposes.”
C.

Enhancing Compliance Guidelines

The Security Rule provides a dearth of specific instructions for regulatory
compliance, preferring to assume good judgment on the part of covered entities.231 This
approach leaves a vacuum of guidance for health care providers with no technological
expertise and with scarce resources with which to hire costly consultants. It also could
encourage malfeasance on the part of prosperous covered entities that could invest
significant resources in ensuring the security of electronic PHI but who choose to take
minimal precautions instead. We recommend that a number of steps be taken to provide
more specific guidance to covered entities.
1.

Augmenting the Implementation Specifications

The HIPAA Security Rule offers skeletal and vague implementation specifications,
which leave many substantial gaps and loopholes. Consequently, a more robust scheme
of standards and implementation specifications would significantly advance the goal of
improved security protection for PHI.232 We focus here on a few suggested revisions.
First, the phrase “criticality of potential risks” in the Security Rule’s “flexibility of
approach” provisions233 and the “risk analysis” requirement in the administrative
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safeguards’ implementation specifications234 should be clarified to indicate that the risks
that are to be considered are the risks to all stakeholders, including data subjects, covered
entities, and business associates.
Second, because effective risk analysis is crucial to a covered entity’s ability to
choose appropriate security measures,235 the Rule must provide further guidance as to
how risk analysis should be conducted. A simple way to do so would be to require
covered entities to follow the NIST Risk Management Guide for Information Technology
Systems.236 In its response to comments provided during the proposed Security Rule’s
public comment period, HHS cited the NIST document as authority,237 but the Security
Rule itself has no reference to it. We recommend that the regulations’ risk analysis
provision238 be amended to require that covered entities’ risk analyses be consistent with
all relevant guidelines established in the NIST “Risk Management Guide for Information
Technology Systems.” If HHS determines at a later time that a better document exists
because the NIST guidance has become outdated or a superior document is issued by a
different organization, the regulatory provision would need to be changed again to refer
to the new source.239
Covered entities that cannot implement this guidance themselves for lack of expertise
or resources could hire vendors to conduct the risk analysis for them or to provide them
with a simplified form of the risk analysis procedure that is tailored to their type of entity.
Vendors who specialize in electronic PHI security will be able to adapt the NIST
guidance to particular categories of businesses that they service and may be able to
accomplish the task by asking clients to fill out a relatively short questionnaire that will
provide all necessary information. The use of vendors for HIPAA compliance purposes
is discussed in the next section of this article.240
Third, the Security Rule must induce covered entities to implement the best current
practices of the health informatics and computer security communities.241 To that end,
the “general requirements” section242 should include an additional element, placed before
the current fourth requirement, worded as follows: “Make reasonable efforts to identify
and employ best practices relating to security measures, software development,
validation, and maintenance, and software system administration that are either
commonly used by industry and governmental institutions or can be clearly demonstrated
234
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to be superior to best common practices.” The best current practices requirement would
apply to all standards and implementation specifications. Thus, if a covered entity
determined that it would not be “reasonable and appropriate” for it to implement an
addressable implementation specification,243 it would need to document why
implementing the specification would not constitute best current practices under the
circumstances.244
The best current practices standard is essential to making the Security Rule
meaningful in light of the dynamic nature of the computer security field. The text of the
Security Rule must maintain a level of generality and cannot dictate that covered entities
adopt specific technologies since these could easily become outdated even before the
regulations are enacted. A “best practices” standard is an effective way to provide some
guidance while maintaining sensitivity to the computer technology environment. This
approach is not unprecedented, since “best practices” standards are found elsewhere in
U.S. law. For example, a provision of the sentencing guidelines that requires the
establishment of effective compliance and ethics programs allows small organizations to
model their programs partly on the “best practices of other similar organizations.”245
Similarly, an Environmental Protection Agency regulation relating to hazardous air
pollutants instructs covered entities to design startup, shutdown, and malfunction plans
that “reflect the best practices now in use by the industry to minimize emissions.”246
As will be discussed below, many if not most covered entities are expected to utilize
vendors to serve their HIPAA Security Rule compliance needs,247 and thus, they will not
themselves need to engage in the work of determining industry standards. Moreover, a
plethora of information about security standards and industry practices is readily
available through the Internet and in print, published by reputable organizations such as
ISO, CERT, NIST, NIAP, and by software vendors.248 Both vendors and covered entities
should easily be able to access these sources.
Fourth, the Security Rule, which currently never once addresses software
engineering, should include language that explicitly focuses on this essential security
component. The best practices provision described above, which would require covered
entities to make reasonable efforts to identify and employ best practices relating to
software development, validation, and maintenance and systems administration, is one
step in the right direction. Furthermore, the risk analysis provision249 should incorporate
an additional statement that the risks to be considered include those associated with
software development, operation, and maintenance. Similarly, the risk management
provision250 should be elucidated to state that the risks and vulnerabilities at issue include
those linked to software development, operation, and maintenance.
2.

Security Product Vendors and Certification
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The previous section recommended a “best current practices” standard as a general
Security Rule requirement. The question to which we now turn is how “best practices”
should be identified and implemented by covered entities.
One option is for CMS, in its oversight capacity, to create a centralized repository of
information. CMS could maintain a website in which it describes the security measures
and technology needed by different entities for compliance purposes, provides a current
list of known security vulnerabilities in health information systems and the computing
platforms they rely upon, and designates the updates and fixes that are sufficient to
address these problems. This approach, however, may run afoul of the notice and
comment requirements established by the Administrative Procedure Act.251 A binding set
of technical requirements could be interpreted to constitute rulemaking, which would
trigger public notice and comment requirements.252 These, in turn, would generate
significant delays and render it impossible for CMS to respond to rapidly changing
technology and emerging security threats in a timely fashion. The law establishes an
exception for cases in which an “agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public
interest.”253 It is possible but not certain that this exception would apply to the abovedescribed website.
Several other problems are inherent in the centralized repository approach. CMS
would require significant additional funding and personnel resources in order to produce
and continuously update a comprehensive set of materials for the website, and it would
need to develop technical expertise that it does not currently have. Furthermore, relying
on a single source of information means that any mistakes or flaws in the information
provided will uniformly affect all covered entities. Finally, if the government retains
power to designate best current practices, covered entities’ security obligations might
vacillate significantly with changes in the political environment. Thus, some
administrations might articulate very demanding standards and others very lax ones.
A superior alternative would be to allow best current practices to emerge through the
free market. Presumably, vendors with security expertise would compete to produce the
best possible products at a reasonable cost. As a check against market flaws that generate
low standards within private industry, covered entities are also instructed to research, as
part of their best practices analysis, the computer security measures that are adopted by
the government.254
It is obvious that many covered entities will lack the technical knowledge and
resources to identify best current practices and achieve Security Rule compliance and will
require the services of computer security professionals. To that end, it would be useful
for CMS to maintain on its website a list of approved vendors who can be retained by
covered entities for purposes of achieving Security Rule compliance. The vendors would
provide both products and technical assistance and would need to have not only technical
expertise but also thorough familiarity with the HIPAA Security Rule. The vendors
251

5 U.S.C. §553(b) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirements for proposed rulemaking).
Id.
253
5 U.S.C. §553(b)(3)(B) (2000).
254
See infra Part IV.C.1 (explaining that best practices are those commonly used by industry and
governmental institutions.).
252

34

would be certified based on proof that their technology is state-of-the-art and Security
Rule compliant, that they have not been negligently responsible for any Security Rule
breaches, and that they are able to address critical new security threats through timely
user advisories, software improvements, and automatic installation of software
updates.255 Vendors would also have to be certified for entities of particular sizes and
types, since different business environments require different services.
Covered entities that retain the certified vendors would be presumed to have complied
with the Security Rule’s requirements, though the presumption could be rebutted by
evidence that they failed to follow the vendor’s instructions or refused to accept the
vendor’s recommendations. It could also be rebutted with evidence that the covered
entity knew or should have known that the vendor was not actually providing products
and services that were Security Rule compliant. This would occur in instances in which a
vendor had been exposed by a whistleblower or the media as engaging in quackery or the
sale of ineffective products. The rebuttable presumption would provide protection
against under-scrutiny by the government during the certification process and against
vendors who might act in bad faith after they are certified in order to under-sell
competitors or enjoy greater profits.
Where appropriate, the vendors should provide clients with alternatives from which
they can select, depending on their resources and capabilities. For example, covered
entities that are experiencing financial difficulties could be given the option of deidentifying all of their electronic PHI. This would entail associating a new, automatically
generated identifier (e.g., a random number) with a patient’s electronic health record. A
list mapping these to patients’ names and/or social security numbers would be maintained
only in paper form. Covered entities that do not hire one of the approved vendors will be
responsible for developing their own implementation measures, which must be at least as
effective as those provided by certified vendors.
Proposals for certification by CMS were discussed in the comments to the proposed
Security Rule.256 CMS asserted that it did not intend to establish certification criteria for
covered entities because it did not “have the resources to address the large number of
different business environments.”257 Similarly, CMS refused to “assume the task of
certifying software and off-the-shelf products” for lack of resources and expertise.258
Instead, CMS believed that compliance assessment instruments should be developed and
implemented by the private marketplace.259
Certification of vendors rather than covered entities or products was not discussed in
the comments.260 This type of certification may be less burdensome for CMS, since there
should be fewer vendors than covered entities or products. It is likely, however, that
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CMS would argue that it lacks sufficient resources and expertise to certify even vendors
alone.
Nevertheless, CMS should reconsider its willingness to provide some form of
certification for compliance purposes. Several comments to the proposed Security Rule
emphasized the need for a list of federally approved security products and for
certification procedures.261 This need is acute for small covered entities that do not have
the funds, personnel, and computer proficiency to assess their Security Rule compliance
or to determine which commercially available security products they should purchase in
order to fulfill regulatory requirements. With vendor certification, resource-poor covered
entities would have an accessible and reliable mechanism to achieve compliance.
CMS acknowledged that other governmental entities are adopting the certification
approach.262 For example, NIST and the National Security Agency (NSA) have
established the National Information Assurance Partnership, whose goal is to help
information technology producers and consumers meet their security testing and
assessment needs.263 To that end, the NSA has established the TEMPEST264
Endorsement Program, through which it provides lists of TEMPEST telecommunications
equipment, TEMPEST test services facilities, and Commercial Off-the-Shelf
telecommunications equipment that it has endorsed.265 Germany has embraced
certification to a much larger extent. Its Federal Office of Information Security (BSI)266
provides certification services through which information technology products and
systems are tested and certified.267
In the comments to the proposed Security Rule, HHS stated that it encourages
professional associations to undertake assessment and implementation activities with
respect to HIPAA Security requirements.268 Assuming that the demand for certified
products grows dramatically with the expansion of the “covered entity” definition, it is
likely that some organizations will become interested in providing certification services
for a fee.
If CMS cannot certify the vendors themselves, it should, at the very least, certify
those who are providing certification. Precedent has been set for this practice as well.
Germany’s BSI not only certifies information technology security products, but also
accredits and licenses evaluation facilities so that they can assess information technology
products and systems.269 ISO, a well-respected non-governmental global federation
261

Id.
Id. (stating that HHS has “noted with interest that other Government agencies such as the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are working towards that end.”).
263
See National Security Agency Central Security Service National Information Assurance Partnership,
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/niap.cfm.
264
TEMPEST, Inc. “offers TEMPEST/EMSEC and Electromagnetic Compatibility testing and design
services in accordance with current Military, FCC, Australian & European Community Requirements.”
http://www.tempest-inc.com/home.htm.
265
National Security Agency Central Security Service Tempest Endorsement Program,
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/tempest.cfm?MenuID=10.2.1.3.
266
Bundersanmt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, http://www.bsi.de/english/index.htm.
267
Bundersanmt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Department III: Counter-Eavesdropping,
Certification, Approval, Accreditation, http://www.bsi.de/english/department3.htm
268
68 Fed. Reg. 8352.
269
Bundersanmt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Department III: Counter-Eavesdropping,
Certification, Approval, Accreditation, http://www.bsi.de/english/department3.htm.
262

36

established in 1946 in order to promote “the international exchange of goods and
services” through the creation of uniform standards,270 has issued several standards that
provide best practices guidance to those operating certification systems.271 One of these,
ISO Guide 65, has been adopted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and is applied to
companies operating product certification standards for livestock, meat, seed, and other
agricultural products.272 Appropriate ISO certification guidelines could also be adopted
by CMS so that it would not have to wholly invent its own criteria. The certification
bodies that are accredited by CMS would in turn certify vendors, and use of the certified
vendors’ products would create a rebuttable presumption of HIPAA security compliance,
as described above. The certifying bodies would have to be recertified by CMS
periodically to ensure their continued competence. Furthermore, the CMS website would
list the certifying bodies, who would then direct covered entities to the vendors they have
approved.
3.

Existing Tools and Emerging Technologies

Ultimately, the electronic PHI security business could develop into a sophisticated
international industry.273 Some tools that will facilitate regulatory compliance and
certification already exist.
ISO and the International Engineering Council (IEC) have published a variety of
standards describing sound information security practices. The ISO/IEC 17799:2005,274
entitled "Information Technology - Security Techniques - Code of Practice for
Information Security Management,” establishes guidelines and “general principles for
initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management
in an organization” by describing best practices in these areas.275 ISO/IEC 27001:2005276
specifies the requirements for initiating, operating, and monitoring an information
security management system in light of the organization's overall business risks.277
ISO/IEC 15408, known as the Common Criteria, establishes an international standard for
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computer security specifications and evaluations.278 Finally, ISO 27799, due to be
published in February of 2007, entitled “Health informatics – Security management in
health using ISO/IEC 17799,” will specifically apply to health information security, if
approved.279
ISO, IEC, and the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IEEE) have
also developed a large number of standards and guidelines for various aspects of software
engineering. Notable examples include ISO/IEC 90003:2004, “Software Engineering -Guidelines for the Application of ISO 9001:2000 to Computer Software,”280 which
provides guidance for organizations concerning the acquisition, supply, development,
operation and maintenance of computer software and related support services, and
ISO/IEC 12207, “Information Technology—Software Life-Cycle Processes,”281 which
establishes a system for software life cycle processes.
In addition, at least one national organization is already devoted to research and
development concerning Internet security. CERT282 is a federally funded center of
computer security expertise, operated out of Carnegie Mellon University’s Software
Engineering Institute. It studies Internet security vulnerabilities and long-term changes in
networked systems and develops information and training to promote improved
security.283 Among its other features, CERT’s website offers security alerts and
solutions. Certification bodies could require vendors to follow CERT’s
recommendations in order to win certification, and covered entities not utilizing vendors
could also rely on these for guidance.
The list of standards and resources provided above is not meant to be exclusive, and,
because of the ever-changing nature of technology and security threats, it would be
impractical to attempt to develop a comprehensive list that would endure over time.
Certification bodies should be entrusted with the task of remaining updated concerning
guidelines and resources that are relevant to PHI security and should distribute pertinent
information to their certified vendors. Similarly, under the “best current practices”
standard discussed above, covered entities that do not take advantage of certified vendors
would be expected to follow applicable industry standards and guidelines for HIPAA
compliance purposes. As an additional aid, CMS should maintain on its website an
updated, non-exclusive list of documents and Internet sources that it recommends to
covered entities.
It should also be noted that in the comments concerning the proposed Security Rule,
HHS acknowledged that it is required to adopt industry standards developed by standards
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developing organizations that are accredited by the American National Standards
Institute,284 the U.S. representative of ISO and IEC.285 In 2003, HHS concluded that the
available security standards were not technology-neutral, were inconsistent with HIPAA,
and were too narrow to be adopted in the final rule.286 The advent of ISO 27799, which
will specifically address health information security,287 should cause HHS to reevaluate
its conclusion and may require revision of the Security Rule to include the new standard’s
adoption.
It is reasonable to expect that implementation of the proposed changes to the HIPAA
Privacy Rule will influence vendors to provide relatively low cost “turnkey” systems288
for processing and maintaining PHI that will be affordable even for small businesses. We
anticipate that all but the largest covered entities will lack the expertise and resources to
achieve Security Rule compliance without the assistance of an intermediary, and thus, the
development of a market for HIPAA compliance aids is essential.
A Google search for HIPAA security turnkey solutions reveals a number of
organizations already purporting to provide such solutions for compliance with the
HIPAA Security Rule. Some offer comprehensive practice management solutions that
combine scheduling, record-keeping, intra-office communication, and billing in a single
application, thereby centralizing all HIPAA related electronic data. These include:
AdvancedMD289 and LeonardoMD Renaissance.290 Other products offer tutorials,
templates, documents, and aids aimed at enabling an entity to achieve HIPAA
compliance. Examples include New Governance HIPAA Privacy Accelerator291 and
HipaaManager HCAT.292 Still other applications are designed for more complex
organizations with more sophisticated technology. Symantec BindView293 is a
compliance management application that analyzes an organization’s current security
profile, suggests modifications based on best-practices, and monitors and reports
compliance-related data (e.g. who is accessing files containing PHI).294 Secure Info
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Compliance Authority295 claims to allow organizations to perform comprehensive selfassessments of regulatory compliance, provides cross-references to industry standards,
and furnishes links to validations tests, recommendations for improvement, and policy
statements.296 It is likely that increasingly sophisticated and cost-effective tools will
continue to be developed in response to marketplace demands for security technology.
D.

Bolstering Enforcement through a Private Cause of Action

The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s lack of a private cause of action diminishes its deterrent
and remedial powers.297 We recommend that the privacy regulations adopt the approach
of many of the other U.S. privacy laws and the European Union Privacy Directive and
establish a private cause of action.298
The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s administrative penalties should be retained alongside the
private right of litigation. This approach will allow governmental intervention even when
no individuals suffer injury, such as in cases in which electronic security is inadequately
maintained but no information is actually obtained by unauthorized third parties. It will
also introduce the threat of private enforcement in cases that would not be prioritized by
the government for political reasons or that the government does not have the resources
to pursue, which may be the vast majority of cases.299 Without a private cause of action,
covered entities may have incentive to conduct a cost-benefit analysis from which they
conclude that the cost of compliance is great and the risk of being penalized for a
violation is very small, which militates against aggressive investment in PHI security
measures.300
The dual enforcement approach of a private cause of action and administrative
penalties is adopted by several other privacy laws. These include the Privacy Act of
1974,301 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,302 and the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act of 1994.303 Borrowing from the private cause of action provisions found
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in other privacy legislation, we recommend that the HIPAA statute include the following
language:304
(a) Any person aggrieved by any act of a covered entity in violation of this
section may bring a civil action in a United States District Court.305
(b) The court may award –
(1) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of
$2,500;
(2) punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law;
(3) reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred;
and
(4) such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be
appropriate.306
In the future, Congress might consider requiring aggrieved parties to exhaust
administrative remedies before filing lawsuits in court. This mechanism has been
embraced by several employment discrimination laws, which establish that potential
plaintiffs must file charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and receive a determination and/or a right to sue before filing a lawsuit in
court.307 Presumably, such a system would filter out many of the weakest cases because
lawyers and potential litigants would be discouraged by negative administrative agency
findings and would not burden the courts with frivolous cases. However, effective
administrative review is dependent upon a strong network of agency offices that are
adequately staffed to process a large volume of claims. DHHS’s anemic HIPAA
enforcement record308 indicates that it does not currently have such resources.
Some cases brought by private litigants may be complex, large, and have farreaching impacts. If vendors or certifying bodies are suspected of being responsible for
304
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Security Rule breaches, they could be joined as defendants309 under theories of
negligence or fraud310 or be brought in by covered entities as third party defendants.311 In
addition, cases involving Security Rule breaches that injure numerous individuals could
generate class actions with hundreds, thousands, or even millions of plaintiffs.312
V
CONCLUSION
An abundance of evidence confirms that our private health information faces
grave threats from a large number of sources.313 The danger of privacy violations will
only intensify in the future with increased computerization and centralization of health
records.314 The U.S. government, which has aggressively promoted the use of electronic
health records,315 has responded to concerns about privacy by enacting HIPAA and its
privacy regulations. However, the legislation and regulations are significantly flawed
from both legal and technical perspectives. Focusing on the HIPAA Security Rule, we
have presented recommendations to rectify some of its considerable weaknesses.
The new requirements outlined in this article would need to be phased in gradually.
Just as existing covered entities were given several years to prepare for compliance with
the HIPAA Privacy Rule,316 new covered entities should be given the same courtesy.
Moreover, time will pass before a sufficiently advanced health information security
industry develops that will make effective and affordable products readily available for
covered entities. The DHHS Secretary should determine a reasonable compliance
deadline for the newly introduced provisions.
A public education campaign would need to be initiated to educate the public about
its rights under the revised regulations and to educate newly covered entities about their
obligations. Similar efforts were made when the original privacy regulations were
enacted.317
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The HIPAA Privacy Rule represents a significant regulatory effort on the part of the
U.S. government and has generated emotional and often negative responses from the
American public.318 The recommendations detailed in this Article should render the
HIPAA Security Rule in particular and the HIPAA Privacy Rule in general far more
meaningful. They should benefit both patients whose privacy and autonomy are at stake
and organizations seeking guidance concerning compliance requirements. It is only with
rethinking some of HIPAA’s statutory and regulatory provisions that electronic PHI will
truly constitute protected health information.
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